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A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
Daniel D. Bradlow* 
Abstract: Increased globalization over the last twenty years has made ef-
fective global economic governance more important than ever. This pe-
riod has witnessed the rise of a number of new international governance 
actors, such as the Group of Twenty and the Financial Stability Board. 
This Article proposes a five-part test to evaluate how the existing global 
governance actors serve the interests of all stakeholders in the global 
economy. The test is based on four fundamental indicators of good global 
governance. The Article uses the five-part test to evaluate the G20’s per-
formance at the G20 Summit at Los Cabos, Mexico. Finally, this Article 
concludes that the G20 is not fully satisfying any of the five parts of the 
test, and therefore fails to reach its full potential as a global economic 
governance actor. 
Introduction 
 Global economic governance has become more complex over the 
past twenty years. The range of issues that require global coordination 
now include topics which were once viewed as falling exclusively within a 
state’s domestic jurisdiction, such as banking regulation, inclusive green 
growth, youth employment, and domestic resource mobilization.1 This 
period has also seen the rise of new global governance actors, such as 
the Group of Twenty (“G20”)2 and the Financial Stability Board 
 
* © 2013, Daniel D. Bradlow, Professor of Law, American University Washington Col-
lege of Law; Extraordinary Professor, University of Pretoria, South Africa. A version of this 
paper was presented at Boston College Law School’s Symposium, Filling Power Vacuums in 
the New Global Legal Order, on October 12, 2012. 
1 See Daniel D. Bradlow, Development Decision-Making and the Content of International Devel-
opment Law, 27 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 195, 210–11 (2004) (explaining that under the 
modern view of development, development actors are concerned with economic, social, 
environmental, and human rights issues as well as traditional economic law issues). 
2 The Group of Twenty (“G20”) defines itself as “the premier forum for international 
cooperation on the most important issues of the global economic and financial agenda.” 
What Is the G20, G20, http://www.g20.org/docs/about/about_G20.html (last visited Apr. 18, 
2013); see also infra notes 25–58 and accompanying text (providing a detailed description of 
the G20). 
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(“FSB”).3 As a result, global economic governance directly affects a 
broad range of state and non-state stakeholders in the global economy, 
many of whom were previously only indirectly affected by these matters.4 
 Unfortunately, most of these stakeholders are not able to partici-
pate effectively in global economic governance decision making.5 In 
some cases, such as with the G20 or the FSB, membership is restricted 
to a relatively small number of states.6 In other cases, such as with the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”)7 or 
the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),8 it is because, although 
membership is more universal, effective participation is de facto limited 
to a smaller number of actors.9 
 The combination of the expanding scope of global economic gov-
ernance and restricted effective participation in the institutional ar-
rangements for global economic governance is problematic. It in-
creases the risk of unanticipated adverse impacts on non-participants in 
                                                                                                                      
3 The Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) was established in 2009 “to coordinate at the in-
ternational level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting 
bodies and to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory 
and other financial sector policies.” See About the FSB: Overview, Fin. Stability Board, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2013); see 
also infra notes 59–67 and accompanying text (describing the FSB). 
4 See Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case 
of the G20, 12 Chi. J. Int’l L. 491, 493--94 (2012) (noting that globalization forces national 
economies to share risks). 
5 See Ngaire Woods, The Challenges to International Institutions, in The Political Econ-
omy of Globalization 202, 208 (Ngaire Woods ed., 2000) (noting that the international 
financial system is generally run by the leading industrialized countries). 
6 See About the FSB: Overview, supra note 3 (explaining that the FSB member institutions 
include institutions from twenty-four countries, as well as international organizations such 
as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”), the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (“IMF”), and international standard-setting bodies such as the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision); What Is the G20, supra note 2 (noting that the 
G20 includes finance ministers and central bank governors from nineteen countries and 
the European Union). 
7 See The International Organization of Securities Commissions, Int’l Org.  Sec. Commis-
sions, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) is the international standard-
setting body for securities markets). 
8 See About the IMF, Int’l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that the IMF is an organization of 188 countries 
that work “to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate inter-
national trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce 
poverty around the world”). 
9 See Daniel D. Bradlow, The Governance of the IMF: The Need for Comprehensive Re-
form 15 (Sept. 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=928467 (observing that there is a significant 
risk that the Group of Seven (“G7”) and other industrialized countries, which dominate the 
IMF, will impose their views on developing countries). 
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global economic governance decision making. Given the increasing 
intensity of globalization, this situation is likely to get worse unless some 
means can be found for enhancing the key decisionmakers’ respon-
siveness to non-participants in their deliberations. One way to do this is 
to critically assess how well these decisionmakers are serving the inter-
ests of all stakeholders in the global economy. 
 This Article proposes a five-part test for making such an assessment 
of global economic governance. The test considers its strategic objec-
tive, its compliance with applicable international legal principles and 
good administrative practice, the scope of its coverage of the relevant 
issues and stakeholders, and the coherence of its institutional relations. 
Part I describes the current arrangements for global economic govern-
ance.10 Part II proposes four factors of good global economic govern-
ance efforts and develops a five-part test to evaluate international insti-
tutions’ performance.11 Finally, Part III applies the proposed assessment 
framework to the outputs of the 2012 G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mex-
ico.12 Based on this test, the Article concludes that the G20 is unable to 
comply fully with any of the four factors of good global governance.13 
I. Current Arrangements for Global Economic Governance 
 Following World War II, the primary actors in global economic 
governance were the IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (“World Bank”), and the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (“GATT”).14 The Bank of International Settlements 
(“BIS”) also played a role, albeit a subordinate one.15 Each of these in-
                                                                                                                      
10 See infra notes 14–72 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 73–104 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 105–173 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
14 See, e.g., Richard N. Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and 
Perspectives of our International Economic Order 284, 348 (1969) (describing the 
creation of the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)); John H. 
Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic 
Rules, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 267, 270 (1982) (describing the post-war creation of global eco-
nomic governance actors); José Antonio Ocampo, Rethinking Global Economic and Social 
Governance, 1 J. Globalization & Dev. 1, 4--5 (2010) (providing a general overview of the 
history of post-World War II global economic governance); see also Fiona Smith, Power, 
Rules, and the WTO, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1063, 1076–79 (2013) (discussing the GATT). 
15 See David J. Bederman, The Bank for International Settlements and the Debt Crisis: A New 
Role for the Central Bankers’ Bank?, 6 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 92, 95–98, 103--104 (1988) (de-
scribing the creation of the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) and its role after 
World War II). 
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stitutions have specialized mandates.16 Over the following decades, the 
number of key actors in global economic governance grew to include 
the Group of Seven (“G7”)17 and the International Monetary and Fi-
nance Committee,18 as well as international standard-setting bodies, 
including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,19 IOSCO,20 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors,21 the Interna-
                                                                                                                      
16 See About BIS, Bank for Int’l Settlements, http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (stating that the BIS’s mission is to “serve central banks in their 
pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster international cooperation in those 
areas and to act as a bank for central banks”); About Us: What We Do, World Bank, http:// 
web.worldbank.org/ (select “About”; then follow the “What We Do” hyperlink) (last up-
dated Mar. 8, 2012) (explaining that the World Bank provides financial and technical assis-
tance to developing countries around the world through two institutions: the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Development Associa-
tion); The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, World Trade Org., http://www.wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining 
that the GATT was originally intended to provide rules for organizing world trade); Over-
view, Int’l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/about/overview.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2013) (stating that the IMF’s goals include “promot[ing] international mone-
tary cooperation and exchange rate stability, facilitat[ing] the growth of international 
trade, and provid[ing] resources to help members”). 
17 See Nicholas Bayne, The G7 Summit and the Reform of Global Institutions, 30 Gov’t & Op-
position 492, 492–509 (1995) (describing the G7 Summit). The G7 includes Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Glossary of 
Statistical Terms, OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1585 (last visited Apr. 
18, 2013). 
18 See Margaret Garritsen de Vries, The Bretton Woods Conference and the Birth of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, in The Bretton Woods-GATT System: Retrospect and Pros-
pect After Fifty Years 3, 15–18 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996) (describing the Bretton 
Woods Conference, which created the IMF); Factsheet: A Guide to Committees, Groups, and 
Clubs, Int’l Monetary Fund (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ 
groups.htm (explaining that the International Monetary and Financial Committee aids the 
IMF by advising and reporting to the IMF Board of Governors). 
19 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, http:// 
www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (stating that the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s role is to provide a forum for committee members from various countries to 
cooperate on banking supervisory issues). 
20 See The International Organization of Securities Commissions,, supra note 7. 
21 See About the IAIS, Int’l Ass’n Ins. Supervisors, http://www.iaisweb.org/About-the-
IAIS-28 (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that the International Association of Insur-
ance Supervisors (“IAIS”) is a group of insurance regulators and supervisors from more 
than 200 jurisdictions). 
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tional Accounting Standards Board,22 and the Financial Action Task 
Force.23 
 Recently, two new global economic governance entities, the G20 
and the FSB, were created. These organizations are discussed below.24 
A. The G20 
 Prior to 2008, the overall manager of the global economic system 
was the G7/G8.25 In 1999, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis,26 the 
G7 recognized that it could not manage the crisis on its own, and its 
leading members invited the ministers of finance from a select group of 
countries, including the G7 countries and the European Union, to 
meet.27 This resulted in the formation of the G20 Ministers of Fi-
nance,28 which became an additional actor in the overall arrangements 
for global economic governance. In 2008, as part of the response to 
that year’s global financial crisis, the G20 was elevated to the level of a 
summit of heads of government.29 The next year, at the Pittsburgh G20 
Summit, the participating states declared that the G20 was the “premier 
forum” for global economic governance.30 Although the practical im-
                                                                                                                      
22 See About the IFRS Foundation and the IASB, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/ 
Pages/IFRS-Foundation-and-the-IASB.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (noting that the Inter-
national Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) is the standard-setting body of the IFRS Foun-
dation, which is a private-sector organization that works to develop globally accepted interna-
tional financial reporting standards). 
23 See About Us, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) is a group of 
representatives of different countries that attempts “to set standards and promote effective 
implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laun-
dering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international fi-
nancial system”). 
24 See infra notes 25–67 and accompanying text. 
25 See Cho & Kelly, supra note 4, at 491 (explaining that the G20 emerged as a coordi-
nating structure in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis). 
26 The Asian financial crisis, which was sparked by a devaluation of the Thai baht, be-
gan in 1997 and later spread across East Asia. See Woods, supra note 5, at 207. 
27 See Cho & Kelly, supra note 4, at 516–17 (explaining that the G20 was formed in 
1999, partially in response to the Asian financial crisis). 
28 The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the Euro-
pean Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. What Is the 
G20, supra note 2. 
29 See Cho & Kelly, supra note 4, at 518 (explaining that in the wake of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, the G7 leaders decided to convene a “summit” including the leaders of G20 
countries). 
30 G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, U. Toronto, G20 Info. Centre (Sept. 24–
25, 2009), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html (declaring that 
the G20 is the “premier forum for our international economic cooperation”). 
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plications of this announcement are not yet clear, it amounted to a 
public acknowledgment that the G7/8 was no longer capable of man-
aging the global economy and needed to share this responsibility with a 
broader group of countries. It is important to note, however, that the 
G7/8 still continues to meet and to play a role in the governance of the 
global economy.31 
 The G20 refers to more than a grouping of countries—it is also a 
short-hand reference to a complex cluster of governance activities. The 
apex of this cluster is the annual summit of the leaders of the G20, 
which is the culminating event of an annual work program consisting 
of two work streams.32 The first, which is guided by ministers of finance 
and central bank governors, deals with a range of financial and eco-
nomic issues.33 These officials meet regularly to discuss global eco-
nomic conditions and to coordinate their responses to these condi-
tions. They are supported by seven working groups, each consisting of 
and co-chaired by officials from G20 states.34 The seven working groups 
deal with developing the framework for strong, sustainable, and bal-
anced growth; financial regulation; financial inclusion; the interna-
tional financial architecture; energy and commodities markets; energy 
and growth; disaster management; and climate finance.35 The working 
groups, in addition to their specific mandates, follow up on the deci-
sions and requests of the G20 leaders, promote cooperation between 
the participants in the G20 process on particular issues, and help shape 
the summit discussions and communiqués.36 
 The second track is the Sherpas’ track.37 This track, in which each 
leader is represented by an official, known as the leader’s “sherpa,” is 
responsible for the political aspects of the G20’s work.38 Its workload is 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Group of Seven–G-7, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/g7. 
asp#axzz2NKqA4Mpb (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
32 See Leaders’ Summit 2013, Russ. G20, http://www.g20.org/docs/summit/summit_2013. 
html (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
33 The Finance Track, G2012 Mex., http://www.g20mexico.org/index.php/en/financial- 
track (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that the Finance Track in the G20 focuses on 
financial and economic issues, including “providing solutions to the current economic prob-
lems, economic stabilization and structural reforms, increasing international coordination 
for crisis prevention, correction of external, fiscal and financial imbalances, providing re-
sources to increase global liquidity, and strengthening the international financial system”). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 Sherpas’ Track, G2012 Mex., http://www.g20mexico.org/index.php/en/sherpas-track 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
38 See id. (noting that the Sherpas’ track focuses on political, non-financial issues). 
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undertaken by working groups and it is supplemented, in some cases, 
by meetings of ministers other than ministers of finance.39 Currently, 
there are working groups for issues such as employment, agriculture 
and food security, energy, corruption, and development.40 
 These activities suggest that the G20 plays three critical global eco-
nomic governance roles. First, it is a crisis manager. In this capacity it 
has forged agreement on the actions that the participants, individually 
and collectively, must take to resolve the current financial crisis. Sec-
ond, the G20 is the orchestrator of global economic governance. It 
provides the setting in which the major economies meet with the lead-
ing international institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”), and the United Nations (“UN”)—to dis-
cuss the key economic challenges facing the international community 
and coordinate their responses to these challenges.41 The G20, there-
fore, enables the relevant policymakers and technical experts from the 
participating countries and international organizations to meet and 
seek common understandings and approaches on particular issues of 
global importance.42 Third, the G20 is a communicator. It helps to 
promote international global awareness of the challenges facing the 
global community and the approach that the most powerful countries 
are considering for dealing with these challenges. 
 There are three aspects of the G20 structure that should be noted. 
First, the number of G20 participants, in fact, exceeds twenty. They 
usually include a number of additional states that are invited by the 
G20 chair, which is the host state for that year’s summit.43 Some of the-
se states, such as Spain, are regularly invited in their own right, and 
some are invited because of their position as chair of an important re-
gional body, such as the African Union or the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations. In addition, the regular participants include interna-
tional organizations like the IMF, the World Bank, the regional devel-
opment banks, the FSB, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”), the International Labor Organization, 
                                                                                                                      
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See G20: Invitees and International Organizations, Russ. G20, http://www.g20.org/docs/ 
about/international_guests.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (noting that international or-
ganizations are invited to the G20 Summit). 
42 See Cho & Kelly, supra note 4, at 523 (noting that G20 progress reports monitor the 
work of organizations such as the IAIS, IOSCO, and BIS). 
43 See G20: Invitees and International Organizations, supra note 41 (noting that the presid-
ing economies invite several non-member countries and institutions to attend the Leaders’ 
summit). 
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the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the WTO, and the UN 
Development Programme.44 These organizations participate in both 
the summits and in the meetings of those working groups that are most 
relevant to their work.45 Because the G20 does not have a permanent 
secretariat, the participating international organizations usually assume 
responsibility for preparing the background studies and policy propos-
als requested by the leaders of the G20.46 For example, the FSB and the 
IMF coordinate studies on financial regulatory issues.47 In addition, 
these organizations can be expected to work with their non-G20 mem-
ber states to implement applicable recommendations of the G20. It is 
not clear what role, if any, they may play in informing the G20 about 
the views of their non-G20 member states. 
 Second, the G20 has begun a process of outreach to other stake-
holders in the global economy. This process, which is managed by the 
chair of the G20, usually includes meetings of business and labor lead-
ers from the G20 countries, and separate meetings of representatives of 
think tanks, civil society, and youth groups from these countries.48 The-
se meetings, which may lead to reports that feed into the G20 process, 
are an opportunity for the G20 to learn the views of other stake-
holders.49 
 Third, the G20 has initiated a peer review process called the Mu-
tual Assessment Process (“MAP”) that is designed to ensure that the 
economic and financial policies of the G20 are coordinated and com-
patible.50 In this process, each of the states is expected to report on its 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id. (noting that such formal international organizations regularly participate in 
G20 meetings). 
45 See id. 
46 See What Is the G20, supra note 2. 
47 See Factsheet: IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise, Int’l Monetary Fund (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ewe.htm (explaining that the G20 has asked the 
IMF and the FSB to coordinate Early Warning Exercises to assess global economic risks). 
48 See Mexico G20 Presidency: Outreach Activities Held in Advance of the Los Cabos Summit, 
G2012 Mex. (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.g20mexico.org/en/publications/325-presidencia- 
de-mexico-del-g20-labores-de-dialogo-y-consulta-rumbo-a-la-cumbre-de-los-cabos (discussing 
Mexico’s outreach activities with non-G20 countries, international and regional organiza-
tions, and various civil society groups). 
49 See id. 
50 The Mutual Assessment Process (“MAP”) was launched at the 2009 G20 Summit in 
Pittsburgh to “evaluate the consistency of the G-20 policies and frameworks with members’ 
shared growth objectives.” See Int’l Monetary Fund, G-20 Mutual Assessment Process: 
From Pittsburgh to Cannes—IMF Umbrella Report 2 (2011), http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/g20/pdf/map2011/umbrella.pdf. 
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macro-economic policies and to have them reviewed by their peers in 
the G20. The IMF helps coordinate the process.51 
 Given its important role in global economic governance, it is strik-
ing that the G20 remains an informal grouping of states and interna-
tional organizations.52 It is not based on a treaty and has no formal in-
ternational legal personality. In addition, it has no permanent head-
quarters or secretariat.53 As a result, the reports, communiqués, and 
documents that it issues have no formal international legal status.54 
Thus, when the G20 states make firm commitments in communiqués 
and other G20 documents, these commitments do not constitute obli-
gations for which states can be held legally responsible.55 
 This does not, however, mean that non-compliance has no conse-
quences for either the G20 states or for other stakeholders. First, in 
some cases, a G20 country’s failure to comply with the G20’s decisions 
can adversely affect its credibility, its relations with other G20 states, and 
its access to financing.56 In addition, G20 decisions can have, and in 
some cases are intended to have, an impact beyond the participants in 
the G20. For example, non-G20 states that fail to comply with G20 fi-
nancial regulatory and transparency requirements can suffer adverse 
consequences in terms of their borrowing costs, their attractiveness to 
foreign investors, and their relations with the states and international 
organizations that participate in the G20.57 Non-state actors in these 
countries, such as financial institutions, can suffer analogous adverse 
consequences.58 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Factsheet: The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), Int’l Monetary Fund (Mar. 
20, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm. 
52 See Jan Wouters & Sven Van Kerckhoven, The OECD and the G20: An Ever Closer Rela-
tionship?, 43 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 345, 346 (2011) (noting that the G20 is an informal 
body with neither a charter nor a voting mechanism). 
53 See What Is the G20, supra note 2 (explaining that the G20 does not have a secretariat 
of its own, but that a temporary secretariat is set up by the country that holds the presi-
dency for the term of its chairmanship). 
54 See Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making 
in the 21st Century 115 (2012) (explaining that commitments made through interna-
tional financial networks “have no legal effect and are unrecognized and nonbinding as a 
matter of international law”). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 116. 
57 See id. at 141--56 (describing the “regulatory tools” that international financial insti-
tutions may employ, which include reputation, market disciplines, financial assistance or 
conditionality, “name and shame,” capital market sanctions, and membership sanctions). 
58 See id. 
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B. The Financial Stability Board 
 The second important global economic governance development 
is the conversion of the Financial Stability Forum (“FSF”) into the 
FSB.59 The FSF was an informal assembly in which national financial 
regulatory authorities—primarily from the G7 countries, international 
organizations with an interest in financial regulation, and the interna-
tional standard-setting bodies—could meet to exchange views and in-
formation on regulatory matters of mutual concern.60 It could under-
take studies and issue reports, but it had no formal legal authority or 
legal personality.61 Following the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 leaders 
decided to convert the FSF into the FSB.62 
 This involved four important changes. First, membership was ex-
panded to include the G7’s regulatory counterparts in the other G20 
countries and some additional systemically important countries.63 Sec-
ond, the FSF mandate was expanded to include assessing the vulner-
abilities in the global financial system and developing regulatory and 
supervisory responses to them, monitoring market developments, work-
ing with the IMF to provide early warnings of financial trouble, dealing 
with cross-border regulation of large financial institutions, and coordi-
nating the work of the international standard-setting bodies.64 Third, in 
2013 the FSB formally established itself as a Swiss association with a dis-
tinct legal personality and greater financial autonomy.65 The FSB’s se-
cretariat, however, continues to operate under the auspices of the BIS, 
allowing the FSB to benefit from the BIS’s grant of immunity from the 
Swiss government.66 Fourth, it has recently established regional consul-
                                                                                                                      
59 See About the FSB: Overview, supra note 3 (noting that the FSB attempts to coordinate 
with national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies to develop 
various regulatory, supervisory, and other policies for the financial sector). See generally 
Eric Helleiner, The Financial Stability Board and International Standards (Ctr. for Int’l Gov-
ernance Innovation, Paper No. 1, 2010) (providing a detailed description of the FSB). 
60 See Helleiner, supra note 59, at 3–4. 
61 See id. at 4. 
62 See id. at 5. 
63 See id. at 5–6. 
64 See id. at 13–14. 
65 Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Meeting of the Financial Stability Board in Zürich on 
28 January ( Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_130128.pdf. 
66 See id.; see also Carl Felsenfield & Genci Bilali, The Role of the Bank in International Set-
tlements in Shaping the World Financial System, 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 945, 956–57 (2004) 
(detailing the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the BIS and affiliated entities under 
Swiss and international law). 
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tative bodies so that interested regulatory authorities from non-FSB par-
ticipating countries can have some input into the FSB’s work.67 
C. Legal Character of Global Economic Governance 
 Although there is now a set of institutional actors to oversee our 
complex and integrated global financial system, there is no obvious 
“governing law” for global economic governance.68 Some of the lead-
ing governance institutions, for example the G20, have no interna-
tional legal personality.69 This provides it with a certain flexibility and 
informality that enables it to adapt relatively quickly to changing cir-
cumstances. It also means, however, that its official documents have no 
formal international legal status.70 This is not a problem for the power-
ful states that participate in the G20—they are able to influence the 
G20’s deliberations and can choose to follow those governance deci-
sions that they favor and to ignore those that they find burdensome. 
 The situation is, however, different for other states. Many of the 
new state participants in the G20 have less discretion. Their credibility 
as responsible participants in global economic governance is influ-
enced by their compliance with at least the most significant decisions 
taken in the forums of global economic governance.71 Similarly, the 
compliance of non-G20 participating states with these decisions may be 
considered in their relations with the IMF and other international fi-
nancial institutions.72 Thus, for these states, and the non-state actors in 
these states, the decisions and actions of global economic governance 
                                                                                                                      
67 See About the FSB: Mandate, Fin. Stability Board, http://www.financialstability 
board.org/about/mandate.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
68 See Brummer, supra note 54, at 115 (noting that commitments made by interna-
tional financial organizations have no legal effect and are nonbinding as a matter of inter-
national law). 
69 See id. at 71 (noting that, although the G20 is important in global economic affairs, 
it has no permanent staff and does not use any formal voting system). 
70 See id. at 72 (describing the various communication methods used by the G20, in-
cluding communiqués, declarations, and progress reports). 
71 See id. at 121–23 (explaining various methods of enforcement of “soft law,” including 
reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation). 
72 See, e.g., Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), Int’l Monetary Fund, 
http://www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (collecting re-
ports by the IMF that summarize the extent of countries’ compliance with internationally 
recognized standards and codes); Supporting Documents Country FSAPs, Int’l Monetary 
Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.aspx (last updated Apr. 12, 2013) (ex-
plaining that the Financial Sector Assessment Program is an analysis of a country’s financial 
sector). 
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de facto have a compliance pull that is stronger than the pull for the 
richer and more powerful states. 
 This differential impact on the various stakeholders in the global 
economy is exacerbated by the legal status of the current arrange-
ments. Legal uncertainty makes it difficult for adversely affected stake-
holders to hold a key actor like the G20 accountable for its decisions 
and actions. This situation of power without accountability is troubling 
and requires a response. One possible response is a framework for as-
sessing the outputs of global economic governance decision making. 
II. A Framework for Assessing Global Economic Governance 
 This Part focuses on my proposed framework for assessing global 
economic governance. The framework consists of four factors, each of 
which is discussed in turn below. The first factor considers whether the 
relevant economic governance actor defines its ultimate goal.73 The 
second factor evaluates the system’s respect for applicable legal princi-
ples, primarily seven principles of customary international law.74 The 
third factor addresses how comprehensively the relevant global eco-
nomic governance actors address the interests of all of the stakeholders 
in the global economy.75 The fourth factor seeks to ensure that global 
economic governance actors act in mutually consistent and supportive 
ways.76 These four factors yield a five-part test that can be used to evalu-
ate the performance of global economic governance actors.77 
A. Factor 1: What Is the Goal? 
 The first challenge for any governance system is to define its ulti-
mate objective. All state and non-state stakeholders agree that every 
society should aim to offer all of its members lives of dignity and oppor-
tunity. Although these stakeholders may differ in how they understand 
and plan to reach this objective, they all acknowledge that it includes 
economic, social, political, environmental, and cultural aspects. More-
over, they should all agree that this goal, which none of them has fully 
achieved, has both an individual and a social dimension. This means 
                                                                                                                      
73 See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
74 See infra notes 79–98 and accompanying text. 
75 See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
76 See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
77 See infra note 104 and accompanying text. I have written about this proposed test else-
where. See Daniel D. Bradlow, Rethinking Global Financial Governance Reform, World Fin. Rev., 
http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=1212 (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
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that the ultimate objective of global economic governance should be to 
achieve “development,” as defined in the Declaration on the Right to 
Development: 
[D]evelopment is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural 
and political process, which aims at the constant improvement 
of the well-being of the entire population and of all individu-
als on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participa-
tion in development and in the fair distribution of benefits re-
sulting therefrom . . . .78 
 This definition suggests two considerations that can be used in a 
global economic governance assessment framework. The first is the ex-
tent to which the actors in global economic governance promote eco-
nomic policies and practices that enable all stakeholders, including the 
weakest societies and the poorest individuals, to share in the benefits of 
the global economic system. The second is that global economic gov-
ernance must promote economic policies that are sustainable and will 
not be undermined over time by their environmental or social costs. 
B. Factor 2: Respect for the Applicable International Law 
 The second factor focuses on the extent to which the relevant gov-
ernance actor pays respect to applicable international legal princi-
ples.79 As indicated above, some significant global economic govern-
ance actors are not subjects of international law.80 Nevertheless, there 
are a limited number of international legal principles, derived from 
customary international law and general principles of law, that are rele-
vant for all actors in global economic governance.81 These principles 
                                                                                                                      
 
78 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
79 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that the key 
sources of international law are: international conventions, international custom as evi-
dence of a general practice accepted as law, and the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations. See Statute of the Court of International Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1153. 
80 See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
81 It should be noted that there are multilateral treaties that deal with aspects of global 
economic governance. The most significant are the treaties establishing the key interna-
tional economic organizations—the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”), and the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”). See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund art. 1, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF Arti-
cles]; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
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are the customary international legal principles of sovereignty; nondis-
crimination, which incorporates treatment of legal and natural persons; 
                                                                                                                      
ment art. 1, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter World Bank Articles]. 
These treaties authorize each of these organizations to perform specific functions relating 
to global trade, monetary policy, and financial system regulation. None of these organiza-
tions, however, are specifically assigned the responsibility for overall governance of the 
global economy. 
The broad language of these founding documents is particularly noteworthy because 
these organizations were intended to be specialized. About Us: History, World Bank, http:// 
web.worldbank.org/ (select “About”; then follow the “History” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 
18, 2013) (explaining that since 1944, the World Bank’s mission has expanded from being “a 
facilitator of post-war reconstruction” to its present mission of alleviating poverty worldwide); 
The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, supra note 16 (noting that in its initial conception 
as the “International Trade Organization,” the WTO was conceived as being a specialized 
agency of the UN); History, Int’l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/about/ 
history.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that the IMF’s role has broadened since its 
initial role, in 1944, of rebuilding national economies). The organizations have effectively 
used this discretion to expand their originally circumscribed role in global economic govern-
ance. For example, the IMF was originally expected to serve as a forum for the exchange of 
views among its member states on international monetary affairs and to manage the par 
value system. See IMF Articles, supra, art. 1 (explaining that the purposes of the IMF are to 
promote international monetary cooperation by providing an institution for consultation 
and collaboration on international monetary problems). It has evolved into an organization 
focused on macroeconomic, monetary, and financial affairs. This evolution occurred even 
though its articles do not explicitly assign it any role in the regulation of financial institutions 
or financial markets. See id. Similarly, the World Bank was originally expected to only be a 
source of financing for large development projects, particularly infrastructure projects. See 
World Bank Articles, supra, art. 1 (explaining that one of the purposes of the World Bank is 
to assist in the reconstruction and development of members’ territories by facilitating in-
vestment). It has evolved into an organization that plays a role in national economic govern-
ance in its member states, in assisting member states in developing the financial systems and 
revenue raising arrangements that allow them to participate in the global economy, and in 
the funding of a broad range of social development projects. 
There is a limit, however, on how far these organizations can stretch the language in 
their founding documents. Consequently, they have been unable to assume full responsi-
bility for all aspects of global governance. 
The states that are involved in global economic governance, of course, are signatories to 
a broad range of international agreements dealing with their international economic rela-
tions. Except for the founding treaties of the international economic organizations, most of 
these treaties either relate to the states’ economic relations with specific states or groups of 
states (e.g., regional trade agreements), or to specific aspects of economic activity (e.g., con-
tracts for the international sale of goods or corruption). See, e.g., U.N. Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988); Regional Trade Agreements, World Trade Org., 
http://www.wto.org/english.tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) 
(discussing regional trade agreements and providing a link to a database of such agree-
ments). They do not provide guidance on how states should conduct themselves in the realm 
of global economic governance. 
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environmental responsibility; good faith; and the general legal princi-
ple of good administrative practice.82 
                                                                                                                     
1. Sovereignty 
 The customary international legal principle of respect for state 
sovereignty provides that global economic governance actors should 
refrain from interfering in those matters that fall within the domestic 
jurisdiction
 
of each sovereign state.83 This obligation is becoming both 
easier and more complex. On the one hand, the scope of matters that 
are deemed by the United Nations to fall within a sovereign state’s do-
mestic jurisdiction has narrowed over time. Currently, for example, 
states are required to report to international supervisory bodies on 
their compliance with specific international human rights agreements 
and so cannot treat their domestic conduct in regard to these human 
rights issues as being exclusively within their domestic jurisdiction.84 
Additionally, there are some who contend that there is an international 
duty to protect groups and individuals from the most systematic and 
gross human rights violations in a particular country.85 On the other 
hand, the resulting expansion in the powers and responsibilities of the 
actors in the international sphere imposes an obligation on them to 
deal responsibly with issues that were previously viewed as being within 
a state’s exclusive jurisdiction and in which their actions can directly 
impact a range of state and non-state stakeholders.86 
 Despite these developments, the legal principle of state sovereignty 
remains an important criterion in assessing global governance. At a 
minimum, it reminds global economic governance decisionmakers that 
they should act in ways that preserve as much independence and policy 
space for states as is consistent with effective global economic govern-
ance. 
 
82 See infra notes 83–98 and accompanying text. 
83 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7; see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law 250, 294–98 (7th ed. 2008) (explaining that international actors should re-
frain from infringing on the principles of state sovereignty). 
84 See Stephanie Farrior, International Reporting Procedures, in Guide to International 
Human Rights Practice 189, 197–201 (Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004) (describing 
reporting procedures of international human rights treaties). 
85 See Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect 51–59 (2009) (describing the 
United Nation’s “responsibility to protect” doctrine, which encourages states to intervene 
in genuine humanitarian emergencies). 
86 See Woods, supra note 5, at 216 (explaining, for example, that the IMF’s role of safe-
guarding the stability of the international monetary system is difficult to accomplish with-
out intruding into countries’ domestic policies). 
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2. Nondiscrimination 
 The principle of nondiscrimination requires subjects of interna-
tional law to treat all similarly situated parties in a like manner.87 The 
impact of the decisions and actions of global economic governance 
will, however, affect different states differently depending on their 
wealth, power, and role in the global economy. This suggests that the 
application of the principle of nondiscrimination to global economic 
governance requires treating all similarly situated states similarly and all 
dissimilarly situated states differently. One way to ensure such nondis-
criminatory treatment would be to apply the principle of special and 
differential responsibilities88 to global economic governance. This 
would require that all states have some way to participate, either di-
rectly or indirectly, in international decision-making structures and in-
stitutions. This would help them protect themselves against having to 
assume responsibilities that are not commensurate with their capacities. 
3. Treatment of Legal Persons 
 The principle of nondiscrimination is also relevant to a state’s re-
sponsibility to corporate actors in the global economy.89 They would be 
eligible for nondiscriminatory treatment when they operate outside 
their home state. This would also include ensuring that they receive at 
least national treatment in their dealings with their host states.90 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-Centered 
Approach Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law, in The Political 
Economy of International Trade Law 32, 45–46, 60–61(Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James 
D. Southwick eds., 2002) (describing the WTO’s principle of nondiscrimination). 
88 See David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 495–
97 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining that the principle of “common but differentiated responsi-
bilities” reflects principles of equity by placing more responsibility on wealthier countries 
and those that are more responsible for causing specific environmental problems); Re-
monda B. Kleinberg, The Politics of International Trade Regulation in the De-
veloping World: Law and Policy of “Preferential” Treatment in the Governance 
of World Trade 4–5, 7 (2011) (noting that special and differential treatment principles 
have been incorporated into the architecture of the WTO rules). 
89 See generally James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on 
State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002) (discussing state 
responsibility in the International Law Commission). 
90 See M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 201–04, 
208, 337, 409–10 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that nondiscrimination is a custom of interna-
tional law). 
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4. Treatment of Natural Persons 
 Many commentators contend that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (“UDHR”)91
 
has taken on the characteristics of custom-
ary international law and, as such, should help define the responsibili-
ties of global economic governance actors to natural persons.92 The 
challenge for global economic governance is that the UDHR contains 
only general principles, as it was always envisaged that they would be 
elaborated upon and eventually made binding through treaties.93 This 
means that the UDHR does not provide clear guidance to global eco-
nomic governance decisionmakers. At most, it suggests that these deci-
sionmakers have an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill those hu-
man rights principles expressed in the UDHR.94 Exactly how each deci-
sionmaker should fulfill these obligations is not clear, and thus, in 
effect, the decision is left to the discretion of each actor. 
5. Environmental Responsibility 
 In regard to customary international environmental law, the most 
relevant obligation is to undertake impact assessments.95
 
Given the im-
portance of sustainability to global economic governance, this principle 
                                                                                                                      
91 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
92 See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National 
and International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 287, 289, 323 (1995) (noting that several 
commentators have taken the position that the entire Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”) now represents customary international law). 
93 Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 
Nw. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 1, 15 (2004) (arguing that the UDHR was written to provide flexi-
bility for countries implementing the declaration, and therefore was not meant to create 
uniform practices). 
94 See Hannum, supra note 92, at 323 (arguing that the UDHR obliges states to guaran-
tee respect for human rights). 
95 See Erika L. Preiss, Note, The International Obligation to Conduct an Environmental Impact 
Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 7 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 
307, 317 (1999) (discussing international environmental impact assessments); see also, e.g., 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 20 
( July 8) (noting that states “must take environmental considerations into account when as-
sessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives”); 
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1907, 1923–24, 1933–34 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1938 & 1941); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janiero, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992); United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 ( June 16, 1972). See generally Hunter et al., supra 
note 88 (discussing economics and sustainable development). 
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is clearly relevant to the conduct of each actor within the realm of 
global economic governance. The principle, however, is stated too gen-
erally to provide guidance on how it should be applied in this context. 
Therefore, global economic actors retain considerable discretion in 
deciding how to apply the principle in their activities. 
6. Principle of Good Faith 
 In this context, the principle of good faith can be interpreted as a 
call for honesty and fairness in dealings between the various actors and 
stakeholders in global economic governance.96 The principle, however, 
offers little guidance to actors seeking to implement it in their global 
governance activities. For example, the principle does not help a deci-
sionmaker know whether or when to consult with each of the stake-
holders in a particular matter of global economic governance, how 
much information to make available to the stakeholders, or how to 
handle complaints from the different stakeholders in the matter. In 
fact, it is possible that honest and fair dealing in a particular interna-
tional economic governance matter may require different answers for 
different stakeholders, depending on their interest in the particular 
matter and, in some cases, the identity of the particular decisionmaker. 
Given these variables, the content of this obligation must be left to the 
discretion of each actor. 
7. Good Administrative Practice 
 Good administrative practice is another important legal criterion 
in evaluating global economic governance.97 The general principles of 
administrative law that are recognized by all nations are transparency, 
predictability, participation, reasoned and timely decision making, and 
accountability.98 These are relevant because global economic govern-
ance, to a significant extent, involves designing rules for regulating the 
                                                                                                                      
96 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith.”); Brownlie, supra note 83, at 635 (discussing the principle of good faith). 
97 See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. 187, 187–214 (2006) (arguing that global administrative law may be undesir-
able); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 Eur. J. Int’l 
L. 23, 23–57 (2009) (arguing that there is a workable concept of law in global administra-
tive law). 
98 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law & 
Contemp. Probs., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 28–29 (describing the principles of 
global administrative law). 
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global economy. In this sense, the actors in global economic govern-
ance may be compared to administrative agencies in domestic law. This 
suggests that they should comply with the applicable principles of good 
administrative practice. 
C. Factor 3: Comprehensive Coverage 
 Comprehensive coverage refers to the need for all the mechanisms 
and institutions of global economic governance to be applicable to and 
serve all the interests of all stakeholders in the international economic 
system. For example, in the case of international financial governance, 
this means that the mechanisms of international financial governance 
must address such diverse matters as all the regulatory, supervisory, re-
source allocation, and developmental needs of states; international or-
ganizations; financial intermediaries that engage in sophisticated na-
tional and cross-border financial transactions and their clients; savers 
and investors who wish to base their financial transactions on religious 
principles; small financial institutions that operate only in local mar-
kets; microfinancial institutions; and small businesses, community 
groups, and individuals that have difficulty accessing financial services. 
In addition, the actors in global economic governance must be flexible 
and dynamic enough to adapt to the changing needs and activities of 
all these stakeholders. 
 One corollary of the principle of comprehensive coverage is that 
the principle of subsidiarity99 should apply to global economic govern-
ance. This principle holds that all decisions should be taken at the low-
est level in the system compatible with effective decision making.100 It is 
a complicated principle to implement because it must apply in stan-
dard operating conditions and in crisis situations, when decisions may 
need to be made at a different level.101 In addition, it may require a 
conflict resolution mechanism that is capable of resolving disputes con-
cerning which level is the most appropriate for resolving a particular 
issue.102 
                                                                                                                      
99 Glossary: Subsidiarity, Europa, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/ 
subsidiarity_en.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (defining the principle of subsidiarity as en-
suring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks 
are made to verify that action at the European Union (EU) level is justified). 
100 See id. (explaining that the principle of subsidiarity requires that the EU not take 
action unless it is more effective than action taken at lower levels). 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
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D. Factor 4: Coordinated Specialization 
 Coordinated specialization acknowledges that, even though all as-
pects of global economic governance are interconnected, global eco-
nomic governance cannot function efficiently without institutions that 
have limited and specialized mandates.103 The principle of coordinated 
specialization is intended to ensure that the actors in global economic 
governance act in mutually consistent and supportive ways to meet all 
the needs of all stakeholders in global economic governance. It has two 
requirements. First, the mandate of the institutions and mechanisms of 
global economic governance must be clearly defined and must be lim-
ited to their areas of specialization. Second, in executing their special-
ized responsibilities, these institutions cannot ignore the impact they 
have and the ways in which they are affected by other actors in global 
governance. Consequently, there is a need for coordination between 
the institutions and mechanisms of international economic governance 
themselves and with the key actors in other areas of global governance. 
The coordinating mechanism’s function is to resolve tension between 
the different actors in global economic governance and between them 
and other actors in global governance. Additionally, it functions to fa-
cilitate coherence in global economic governance. 
E. A Framework for Evaluating Global Economic Governance 
 Based on the four factors described above, it is possible to develop 
the following five-part test104 for assessing performance of the various 
actors in global economic governance: 
 1. What is the strategic goal of the global economic governance 
actor? 
 2. Does the global economic governance actor incorporate the 
applicable customary international legal principles into its de-
liberations? 
 3. Does the global economic governance actor make decisions 
that comply with the principles of good administrative prac-
                                                                                                                      
103 This principle is not new and underlies the role of the Economic and Social Coun-
cil (“ECOSOC”) in the United Nations (“UN”) system. See Gene M. Lyons, Competing Vi-
sions: Proposals for UN Reform, in The United Nations System: The Policies of Member 
States 41, 77–80 (Chadwick F. Alger et. al. eds., 1995) (noting that the UN includes a 
cluster of economic and social programs that should be coordinated by the ECOSOC). 
104 It should be noted that not all parts of the test may be applicable to each individual 
global economic governance actor. Given its central role in global economic governance, 
however, all five parts are applicable to the G20. 
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tice—namely, transparency, predictability, participation, rea-
soned and timely decision making, and accountability? 
 4. Are the institutions of global economic governance designed 
to, and do they, in fact, address all global economic govern-
ance issues of interest to all of the various state and non-state 
stakeholders in the global economy? 
 5. Are there mechanisms for coordinating the decisions and ac-
tions of the particular global economic governance actor with 
other actors in both global economic governance and in other 
areas of global governance? 
III. Applying the Framework to the 2012 G20 Summit 
 This Part uses the five-part test described in Part II to evaluate the 
outcomes of the 2012 Group of Twenty (“G20”) Summit in Los Cabos, 
Mexico (the “Summit”). Section A describes the various communiqués 
and declarations that emerged from the Summit.105 Section B then ap-
plies the proposed test to these outputs to evaluate the G20’s success as 
a global governance actor.106 
A. The Outcome of the Los Cabos Summit 
 The Los Cabos Leadership Declaration (the “Declaration”),107 the 
communiqué issued by the leaders at the end of the Summit, makes 
clear that although the Summit was dominated by the Eurozone cri-
sis,108 the leaders discussed other matters. The Declaration is divided 
into the following sections: supporting economic stabilization and the 
global recovery; employment and social protection; trade; strengthen-
ing the international financial architecture; reforming the financial 
sector and fostering financial inclusion; enhancing food security and 
addressing commodity price volatility; meeting the challenges of devel-
opment; promoting longer term prosperity through inclusive green 
                                                                                                                      
105 See infra notes 107–131 and accompanying text. 
106 See infra notes 132–173 and accompanying text. 
107 See generally G20 Leaders Declaration, G2012 Los Cabos Mex., http://g20mexico.org/ 
images/stories/docs/g20/conclu/G20_Leaders_Declaration_2012.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 
2013) [hereinafter Leaders Declaration] (summarizing the outcome of the 2012 G20 Summit at 
Los Cabos, Mexico). 
108 See id. at ¶¶ 6, 11 (explaining that the Eurozone crisis is shorthand for the Euro-
pean debt crisis, in which several European countries have struggled to service their sover-
eign debt obligations). 
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growth; and intensifying the fight against corruption.109 In each sec-
tion, the leaders explain why they think the issue is important and they 
commit, or often recommit, themselves to certain objectives.110 They 
do not, however, necessarily specify what actions they will take to 
achieve these objectives.111 They also request different actors, such as 
their ministers of finance or specific groups of international organiza-
tions, to undertake certain studies or prepare particular reports.112 
                                                                                                                     
 At the Summit, the leaders also issued the Los Cabos Growth and Jobs 
Action Plan113 in which they promised to undertake a range of country 
and group-specific measures to protect the integrity of the Eurozone 
and promote fiscal sustainability, price stability, and job creation.114 
They also released a document containing the relevant policy commit-
ments of each G20 member state.115 Most of the participating states, 
however, had previously committed themselves to these actions in ear-
lier G20 meetings and/or in domestic policy documents.116 
 The Summit participants also reasserted their determination to 
implement the Los Cabos Accountability Assessment Framework, which cre-
ates a process for peer review of each participating state’s implementa-
tion of the G20’s Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.117 
Finally, the first report on the Mutual Assessment Process (“MAP”), 
which the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) helps implement, was 
issued at the Summit.118 
 
109 See generally id. (dividing the Leaders Declaration into different sections based on 
the topics discussed). 
110 See generally id. (summarizing the relevant issues and setting forth objectives). 
111 See generally id. (setting forth objectives without listing specific plans to accomplish 
those objectives). 
112 See generally id. (noting that the G20 is seeking the help of international financial 
organizations and finance ministers in preparing evaluations of its proposed projects). 
113 See The Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan, U. Toronto, G20 Info. Centre ( June 
19, 2012), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos-actionplan.html. 
114 See id. 
115 See Policy Commitments by G20 Members, G2012 Mex. ( June 18–19, 2012), http://www.g 
20mexico.org//images/stories/docs/g20/conclu/Policy_Commitments_By_G20_Members.
pdf. 
116 See id. 
117 See The Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan, supra note 113 (explaining that the 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth incorporates the Cannes Action Plan and 
intensifies the Group of Twenty’s (“G20”) efforts for a strong and sustained recovery). 
118 See id. 
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 One noteworthy action announced at the Summit was that a group 
of countries, including all the “BRICS” countries,119 agreed to lend new 
funds to the IMF for use in future IMF operations, including in the Eu-
rozone.120 Many of these countries are hoping that their contributions 
will help accelerate IMF governance reform.121 
 The Summit outputs also include the progress report of the G20 
Development Working Group.122 This report reaffirms the G20’s com-
mitment to promoting such international objectives as the Millennium 
Development Goals123 and development effectiveness.124 In addition, 
the report discusses, in some detail, implementation of the Working 
Group’s priorities—infrastructure, food security, and inclusive green 
growth.125 For example, the document stipulates that “incorporating 
social and environmental costs and benefits into economic decision-
making is critical to [inclusive green growth].”126 In regard to infra-
structure, it states that the G20’s approach to infrastructure should seek 
“synergies” with inclusive green growth and the Working Group’s de-
velopment pillars—food security, human resource development, trade, 
private investment with job creation, growth with resilience, financial 
inclusion, domestic resource mobilization, and knowledge sharing.127 It 
adds that “adequately designed infrastructure investments offer oppor-
tunities for triple wins: economic growth, social inclusion and greater 
environmental sustainability.”128 In regard to food security, the report 
highlights the importance of agricultural research and welcomes the 
work that is being done by other international bodies.129 It also en-
courages all countries to support the Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
                                                                                                                      
119 “BRICS” stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and is an economic 
modeling exercise to forecast global economic trends. See About BRICS, BRICS, http://www. 
brics5.co.za/about-brics/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
120 Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, Joint Statement by the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee and the Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Gov-
ernors on IMF Resources (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/ 
pr12144.htm. 
121 See id. 
122 See 2012 Progress Report of the Development Working Group, G20 Dev. Working Grp. 3–4 
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 Progress Report], http://www.g20mexico.org/images/stories/docs/ 
g20/conclu/2012_Progress_Report_Of_The_Development_Working_Group.pdf. 
123 Millennium Development Goals, CESVI, http://www.cesvi.eu/UserFiles/File/Mdgs.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
124 See 2012 Progress Report, supra note 122, at 1–2. 
125 See id. at 1. 
126 Id. at 3. 
127 See id. at 4. 
128 Id. 
129 See id. at 7. 
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Investment That Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources130 and the Volun-
tary Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forest in 
the Context of National Food Security.131 
                                                                                                                     
B. Applying the Framework 
 This Section assesses the Summit outputs under the framework of 
the five-part test proposed in Part II.132 At the end of this Section, I 
conclude that the G20 is not fully satisfying any of the tests as a global 
economic governance actor.133 
1. Does the G20 Have a Strategic Objective for Global Economic 
Governance? 
 At a rhetorical level, the G20 appears to have a strategic goal of 
inclusive growth. The Los Cabos documents discuss the importance of 
inclusive green growth, job creation, social security, and financial inclu-
sion.134 The documents do not, however, define what “inclusion” means 
for the G20, nor do they provide any guidance on the strategy for 
achieving it.135 This is particularly important given that there is no gen-
eral consensus on how inclusion can most effectively be incorporated 
into the way in which specific development policies are made and exe-
cuted and how development projects are selected, prepared, imple-
mented, and operated. 
 The G20 seems to address this issue indirectly through its institu-
tional arrangements and work program. For example, the creation of 
the Development Working Group, in part, is an effort to ensure that 
 
130 See 2012 Progress Report, supra note 122, at 7–8; see also Principles for Responsible Agricul-
tural Investment That Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources, Food & Agric. Org. of the 
United Nations (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/INTER 
NATIONAL-TRADE/FDIs/RAI_Principles_Synoptic.pdf (proposing a set of principles for 
agricultural investment). 
131 See 2012 Progress Report, supra note 122, at 7–8; see also Food & Agric. Org. United 
Nations, Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (2012), http://www. 
fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs/Docs1112/VG/VG_Final_EN_May_2012.pdf (proposing 
guidelines for the governance of tenure of land, fisheries, and forests, in order to work to-
ward greater food security). 
132 See supra note 104 and accompanying text; infra notes 133–173 and accompanying 
text. 
133 See infra notes 174 and accompanying text. 
134 See generally Leaders Declaration, supra note 107 (explaining that inclusive green 
growth, job creation, social security, and financial inclusion were some of its foremost goals 
at the Summit). 
135 See id. 
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the issues of development are included in global economic governance. 
In addition, the G20 has created a group to work on financial inclu-
sion136 and has asked the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to 
study the impact of specific financial regulatory reforms on emerging 
markets and developing countries.137 It has also taken actions that are 
designed to reduce price volatility in commodity markets and to pro-
mote food security.138 Further, the G20 has played a role in seeking to 
reform the governance structures of the multilateral development 
banks and the IMF, and in ensuring that they have sufficient resources 
to fulfill their mandates.139 This is relevant because their mandates, at 
least to some extent, deal with the challenge of exclusion at the level of 
the global economic system.140 These measures are all still in the proc-
ess of being implemented, so it is too soon to judge their efficacy. 
 The G20 also seems to have established an objective of promoting 
environmentally sustainable development. The Summit documents ad-
dress such environmental challenges as green growth and food secu-
rity.141 In addition, the Development Working Group’s report empha-
sizes the importance of incorporating environmental considerations 
into economic decision making, and infrastructure project planning, 
construction, and operation.142 These documents do not, however, in-
dicate that the G20 made any attempt to consider systematically how 
this should be done. There is no discussion in these documents, for 
example, of how to manage the complex trade-offs between maximiz-
ing economic benefits and mitigating the environmental and social 
costs that are likely to be associated with economic growth, even if it is 
inclusive and sustainable. This is particularly troubling because there is 
                                                                                                                      
136 See Relevant Documents by Working Group, G2012 Mex., http://www.g20mexico.org/ 
en/working-groups (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that the group is called the 
Financial Stability Board and Alliance for Financial Inclusion). 
137 See Leaders Declaration, supra note 107, ¶¶ 39–40 (describing the Basel Committee’s 
forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters). 
138 See id. ¶¶ 55–62. 
139 See The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, U. Toronto, G20 Info. Centre ¶¶ 9, 11 
(Nov. 11–12, 2010), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.html (describing the Seoul 
Summit’s reforms of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)); The G-20 Toronto Summit 
Declaration, G20 Toronto ¶¶ 3, 4, 23–34 ( June 26–27, 2010), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/ 
2010/g20_declaration_en.pdf (discussing the G20’s work with the IMF and multilateral de-
velopment banks). 
140 See, e.g., Samjeev Gupta et al., Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Int’l Monetary Fund, The 
IMF and the Poor 2 (1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam 
52/52.pdf (explaining that IMF policy advice can benefit the poor by influencing a coun-
try’s macroeconomic policies, social safety nets, and public expenditures). 
141 See, e.g., 2012 Progress Report, supra note 122, ¶¶ 6–15. 
142 See id. at 14. 
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clear evidence that these trade-offs exist, are complicated, are capable 
of generating intense and sustained conflicts, and are seldom effec-
tively resolved.143 
 Based on the record of the Los Cabos Summit, in regard to the 
first test, the G20’s record is mixed. Rhetorically, it appears to have a 
strategic vision, but it is only articulated in very general terms. Conse-
quently, there is considerable risk that this shared vision will be under-
mined by the specific issues relevant to converting the general vision 
into an operationally useful one. 
2. Adherence to International Legal Principles 
 As indicated above, there are a limited number of international 
legal principles that are applicable to the G20 process.144 The first is the 
principle of respect for state sovereignty. There is nothing in the G20 
documents to suggest that the international legal subjects that partici-
pate in the G20 have done anything in regard to G20 participating 
states that is inconsistent with this principle. All the commitments made 
in the Summit document are voluntarily assumed by the particular 
states.145 Moreover, the commitments are nonbinding, so the states re-
main free, at least as a formal legal matter, to set them aside.146 
 The impact of the G20 on non-participating states is more prob-
lematic. The G20’s decisions can be made applicable to non-participat-
ing states through the operations of international organizations like the 
IMF. In addition, the outputs of the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) 
and the standard-setting bodies, which feed into the G20 decision-
making process, can constrain the policy choices of these countries. 
Although this may be a de facto rather than a de jure limitation on the 
policy space open to these non-participating states, the fact that the 
impact arises from processes and institutions in which these non-
participating states both do not participate and have no ability to hold 
decisionmakers accountable is a challenge to their rights as sovereign 
states. 
                                                                                                                      
143 See, e.g., Mohan Munasinghe, Is Environmental Degradation an Inevitable Consequence of 
Economic Growth: Tunneling Through the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 29 Ecological Econ. 
89, 89 (1999) (noting that economic reforms that contribute to economic gains often re-
sult in adverse side effects). 
144 See supra notes 79–98 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text (explaining that the G20 has no for-
mal legal character). 
146 See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
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 The second principle is nondiscrimination. As discussed above, 
this principle requires that all similarly situated subjects of international 
law be treated similarly and that all differently situated subjects receive 
differential treatment.147 Prima facie, the Summit documents do not 
discriminate between states and do not provide any more favorable 
treatment to any particular state or group of states. The documents, 
however, implicitly recognize that all states are not similarly situated.148 
This is evident, for example, in the references to “inclusive” growth, 
which implicitly acknowledges that current growth strategies have dif-
ferential impacts on both state and non-state stakeholders in global 
economic governance.149 Although the documents, in effect, suggest 
that states address these differential impacts, they do not require par-
ticipating states to do anything to ensure that growth is “inclusive.”150 
 This is particularly concerning in regard to non-participating states 
and their citizens. The G20 has attempted to open channels of com-
munication with these non-participating states by inviting representa-
tives of key regional organizations to participate in its meetings. In ad-
dition, at least in principle, another channel for communication avail-
able to these states is through the international organizations like the 
IMF and the World Bank, which should represent the interests of all 
their member states in their interactions with the G20. There is no evi-
dence, however, that the G20 requires these organizations to consult 
with the non-participating states or asks them about the views of these 
non-participating states. 
 The third principle relates to the treatment of non-state actors in 
global economic governance.151 As indicated above, this means that the 
G20, in its decisions and actions, should respect such principles as na-
tional treatment in regard to legal persons, and human rights in regard 
to natural persons.152 There is clearly nothing explicit indicating that 
the G20 has acted or would condone actions that are inconsistent with 
the human rights of natural persons. There is also no indication that 
the G20 participating states and institutions have done any impact as-
sessment to ensure that the policies and practices that they advocate in 
the G20 documents will not have adverse human rights impacts. Simi-
                                                                                                                      
147 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
148 See, e.g., Leaders Declaration, supra note 107, ¶¶ 61–76 (discussing inclusive growth). 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of natural 
persons). 
152 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
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larly, although the G20 does consult with business groups153 and the 
international standard-setting bodies do consult with financial institu-
tions, the Summit documents do not indicate that the G20 paid system-
atic attention to the impacts of their policies and practices on all af-
fected legal persons in their participating states and elsewhere.154 
 The above suggests that the G20 is only partially adhering to inter-
national legal principles. Although it is formally complying with each of 
the applicable international legal principles, it has not made substantial 
efforts to address the fact that its policies and actions have differential 
and potentially adverse implications for non-participating state and 
non-state stakeholders. As a result, there is a substantial risk that the 
implementation of the G20’s policies and practices may not entirely 
comply with these principles. 
3. Good Administrative Practice 
 This test seeks to evaluate how well the G20 complies with the prin-
ciples of transparency, participation, predictability, reasoned and timely 
decision making, and accountability. At the Summit, the G20 did com-
ply with the principle of transparency: it released information about the 
schedule of its meetings, and communiqués and other documents have 
been made public.155 
 The G20, however, only partially complied with the principle of 
participation. The Mexican chair made arrangements for some partici-
pation by some non-G20 states.156 In addition, Mexico organized meet-
ings with business leaders, labor leaders, think tanks and researchers, 
youth, and civil society from G20 countries prior to the Los Cabos 
Summit.157 The invitees to these meetings, however, attended in their 
personal capacities and without any mandate from broader groupings 
                                                                                                                      
153 The “Business-20” Summit (“B20”) is aimed at fostering dialogue between govern-
ments and the global business community). See What Is the B20?, B2012 Mex., http://www.b20. 
org/whatis.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
154 See generally Leaders Declaration, supra note 107 (providing one example of a Summit 
document). 
155 See 2012 Los Cabos Summit, U. Toronto, G20 Info. Centre ( June 18–19, 2012), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/summits/2012loscabos.html (collecting the Los Cabos Sum-
mit documents). 
156 See Invited Countries and International Organizations, G2012 Mex., http://www.g20 
mexico.org/index.php/en/invited-countries-and-international-organizations (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2013) (noting that Spain, Benin, Cambodia, Chile, Columbia, Ethiopia, and several 
international organizations were invited to the 2012 Los Cabos Summit). 
157 See Broader Discussion, G2012 Mex., http://g20mexico.org/index.php/en/dialogue-
with-other-actors-and-side-events (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that the Mexican 
presidency appointed a special representative to increase outreach to such groups). 
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in their own countries or regions.158 In addition, because these meet-
ings were arranged at the discretion of the Mexican G20 chair, it is not 
certain that future G20 chairs will continue these initiatives. Moreover, 
there is no formal process through which interested stakeholders, who 
were not invited to these meetings, can submit information either to 
these informal meetings or to the formal G20 meetings. 
 In addition, there is no requirement that the G20 chair or other 
participants in G20 meetings report back to interested parties on the 
content of these meetings.159 The latter are reduced to learning about 
the work of the G20 and the content of these meetings from the pub-
licly available G20 documents. 
 It should be noted that the consultations arranged by the G20 
chair may be supplemented by initiatives of individual G20 countries. 
For example, South Africa regularly consults with other African coun-
tries through the Committee of Ten (“C10”), a grouping of ten African 
ministers of finance and central bank governors, about items on the 
G20 agenda of interest to African countries.160 
 The requirement of predictability in G20 procedures is difficult to 
evaluate, given that the G20, in part, is a crisis manager that must re-
spond to events as they arise. In its communiqués and documents, 
however, the Summit closely followed the language of previous summits 
and indicated what its work plan for the next year would be. In this lim-
ited sense, therefore, it is a reasonably predictable entity. 
 The Summit communiqués and documents meet the test of rea-
soned decision making. The communiqués provide some explanation 
for the commitments that the countries made at the Summit, and they 
are supported by the reports and other documents released at the 
Summit that provide more detailed explanations for the decisions con-
veyed in the Summit communiqués.161 The process through which is-
sues are selected for consideration in the G20 process and for inclusion 
in the communiqués, however, is less well explained. 
 The G20 pays limited attention to the principle of accountability. It 
has established the MAP, a peer review process through which individ-
                                                                                                                      
158 See id. 
159 See supra notes 25–58 and accompanying text (describing the format and legal sta-
tus of the G20). 
160 Committee of 10 (C10) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Nat’l Treasury, 
Republic of S. Afr., http://www.treasury.gov.za/c10/c10.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) 
(noting that South Africa’s finance minister is a member of the Committee of Ten (“C10”)). 
161 See, e.g., The Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan, supra note 113, at 6 (noting that 
the Mexican Presidency’s website provides details on country-specific reform commitments 
discussed in the document). 
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ual G20 states report to the IMF, the MAP implementing agency, and 
through it to the other G20 states about their fulfillment of the com-
mitments they made in G20 documents.162 Non-G20 states, however, 
have no formal channel through which they can hold the G20 partici-
pants, either individually or collectively, accountable for the direct ad-
verse effects of the G20’s commitments and decisions that they experi-
ence.163 Similarly, there are no channels through which non-state actors 
can hold the G20 accountable.164 
 The lack of an accountability mechanism and the limited partici-
pation in the G20 process can create problems. For example, the G20 
did not consult fully with all affected states and regulatory authorities 
before endorsing the new capital adequacy standards adopted by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.165 As a result, it failed to 
fully appreciate the impact of the new capital adequacy standards on 
developing countries. When it became clear that the new standards 
would have a significant adverse impact, the G20 was forced to request 
a new study of this matter.166 
                                                                                                                     
 Based on the above, the G20 meets the requirements of transpar-
ency, predictability, and reasoned decision making. On the other hand, 
it only partially complies with the principle of participation, and it fails 
to comply with the principle of accountability. 
4. Comprehensive Coverage 
 The G20’s participants intend it to be the premier global eco-
nomic governance body. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect it, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, to address all issues of interest to all state and 
non-state stakeholders in global economic governance. Although the 
Summit agenda was not comprehensive, it attempted to address all 
global economic issues of interest to its participants. The agenda in-
cluded such diverse issues as financial regulation, monetary and mac-
roeconomic policies, financial inclusion, trade relations, employment, 
 
162 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (describing the Mutual Assessment 
Process (“MAP”)). 
163 The G20 leaders have asked the G20 Development Working Group to study options 
for creating some form of accountability mechanism and to report back to them at their 
next summit. See Leaders Declaration, supra note 107, ¶ 64. 
164 See id. 
165 See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel 
III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Sys-
tems 52 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
166 See Leaders Declaration, supra note 107, ¶¶ 39–43 (welcoming proposals and reports 
from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision). 
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green growth, energy, and food security.167 The way in which it ad-
dressed these issues does not necessarily incorporate the concerns and 
interests of all stakeholders in the global economy. Thus, for example, 
the G20 may pay more attention to price volatility as a food security is-
sue, rather than to the concerns of small-scale farmers, who lack access 
to markets and are concerned about land tenure issues. 
 In 2012, the G20 attempted to expand the range of stakeholder 
views and interests that it considered. Mexico, the G20 chair, invited 
business, labor, youth, civil society, and think tanks from G20 countries 
to meet and present their views.168 It did not, however, create mecha-
nisms for consulting with comparable groups of stakeholders from non-
G20 countries. It also did not formally incorporate all the non-
participating regional organizations169 that are stakeholders in its deci-
sions and actions. The lack of mechanisms for consulting with all these 
stakeholders creates a risk that the G20 is not addressing the concerns 
of these stakeholders. 
 The above indicates that the G20 is in partial compliance with the 
principle of comprehensive coverage. It is clear that the G20 considers 
a broad range of issues and seeks to consult widely within the G20 
countries and with other relevant international actors. Because it does 
not consult systematically with state and non-state actors outside the 
G20, however, it cannot be confident that it fully understands and ade-
quately addresses their interests and concerns. 
5. Coordinated Specialization 
 The logic of this test is to ensure, at a minimum, consistency be-
tween the decisions and actions of the G20 and those of all other global 
and regional actors involved with issues of relevance to global economic 
governance. The G20 attempts to meet this test at the global level by 
incorporating a number of international organizations into its delibera-
tions and activities.170 In fact, the G20 delegates some of its work to 
                                                                                                                      
 
167 See Mexican Presidency of the G20, G2012 Mex., http://g20mexico.org/index.php/ 
en/mexican-presidency-of-the-g20 (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (discussing the priorities for 
the Summit). 
168 See Mexico G20 Presidency: Outreach Activities Held in Advance of the Los Cabos Summit,  
supra note 48. 
169 For example, the G20 does not include subregional economic organizations like 
the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”), the South African Devel-
opment Community (“SADC”), or the Common Market of the South (“MERCOSUR”). 
170 See Frequently Asked Questions, Russ. G20, http://www.g20.org/docs/links/faq.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (explaining that the G20 also works closely with other international 
organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”), the 
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these international organizations.171 Unlike the G20, they have the ca-
pacity to undertake studies, monitor activities, and negotiate with non-
G20 states about the implementation of the decisions of the G20.172 
                                                                                                                     
 The G20 has made less comprehensive efforts at the regional level, 
however. Although it does include some regional organizations in its 
activities, the G20 does not have mechanisms for consulting with or 
delegating decisions to a range of important regional and subregional 
organizations.173 This makes it difficult for the G20 to comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity, which requires that governance decisions are 
made at the appropriate level within the global economic governance 
system. 
 The conclusion that follows from this situation is that the G20, at 
best, can only partially comply with this test. It will not fully comply with 
the test of coordinated specialization until it develops mechanisms and 
procedures for consulting with, and where appropriate, delegating re-
sponsibilities to regional and subregional organizations. 
6. Framework Results 
 To summarize, the G20 does not completely satisfy any part of the 
proposed five-part test for global economic governance actors pro-
posed in this Article. First, it only articulates its strategic vision in gen-
eral terms that are difficult to operationalize. Second, it does not en-
tirely comply with all applicable international legal principles, such as 
the principle of nondiscrimination and its application to natural and 
legal persons. Third, the G20 does not completely apply the principles 
of good administrative practice. In this regard, it conforms to the prin-
ciples of transparency, predictability, and reasoned decision making, 
but only partially satisfies the principle of participation, and does not 
comply with the principle of accountability. Fourth, the G20 does not 
meet the requirements of the test of comprehensive coverage because 
many stakeholders are excluded from its activities. Fifth, the G20 does 
not fully pass the test of coordinated specialization. One reason for this 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), the United Nations (“UN”), and the International Labor Organiza-
tion). 
171 See, e.g., Leaders Declaration, supra note 107, at 6–8 (requesting progress reports from 
the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and the Bank of International Settlements (“BIS”)). 
172 See id. 
173 See supra notes 25–58 and accompanying text (discussing the formal and legal char-
acter of the G20). 
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is that it fails to coordinate its activities with relevant regional and sub-
regional organizations. 
Conclusion 
 This Article has argued that we must establish a basis for critically 
assessing the performance of the key actors in global economic gov-
ernance. It proposes a five-part assessment framework for determining 
the effectiveness and responsiveness of global economic governance, 
and applies it to the outputs of the 2012 G20 Summit at Los Cabos, 
Mexico. 
 This Article concludes that the G20 is unable to fully comply with 
any part of the assessment framework. This suggests that the G20 is 
unlikely to meet the needs of all stakeholders in global economic gov-
ernance. Given that this is the first application of the assessment 
framework and that it is only applied to the outputs of one G20 Sum-
mit, however, the conclusion is necessarily preliminary. One way to fur-
ther test the conclusion would be to evaluate how effectively the G20, in 
all its Summit outputs, incorporates and responds to the concerns of 
particular groups of stakeholders in global economic governance.174 
Another would be to apply the framework to the outputs and activities 
of other global economic governance actors and decisionmakers. 
 
174 The author has attempted to do this in his forthcoming paper. See generally Daniel 
D. Bradlow, The G20 and Africa: A Critical Assessment, Global Econ. Governance Af-
rica (forthcoming as South African Institute for International Affairs Occasional Paper) 
(on file with author). 
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